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In recent paper [1], Kye et al. claim that using the
blind polarization, their new quantum key distribution
scheme can be secure even when a key is embedded in
a not-so-weak coherent-state pulse. Here we show an
eavesdropping scheme, by which the eavesdropper can
achieve the full information of the key with a probability
of unity and will not be discovered by the the legitimate
users, even in the case that they have the perfect single-
photon source and the loseless channel.
There are two protocols in Ref. [1]. Consider their first
protocol:
Protocol 1:
(a1) Alice(the sender) prepares a linear polarized qubit
in its initial state |ψ〉0 = |0〉, where |0〉 and |1〉 represent
two orthogonal polarizations of the qubit, and chooses a
random angle θ.
(a2) Alice rotates the polarization of the qubit by θ,
to bring the state of the qubit to |ψ〉1 = Uˆy(θ)|ψ〉0 =
cos θ|0〉 − sin θ|1〉, and then sends the qubit to Bob(the
receiver).
(a3) Bob chooses another random angle and rotates
the polarization of the received qubit by φ; |ψ〉2 =
Uˆy(φ)|ψ〉1 = cos(θ+ φ)|0〉 − sin(θ+ φ)|1〉, Bob sends the
qubit back to Alice.
(a4) Alice rotates the polarization angle of the qubit by
−θ and then encodes the message by further rotating the
polarization angle of ±pi
4
; |ψ〉3 = Uˆy(±
pi
4
)× Uˆy(−θ)|ψ〉2,
Alice send the qubit to Bob. (Alice and Bob have prede-
termined that +pi
4
is say, “0” and −pi
4
is “1”.
(a5) Bob measure the polarization after rotating the
polarization by −φ; |ψ〉4 = Uˆy(−φ)|ψ〉3 = Uˆy(±
pi
4
)|ψ〉0,
Uˆy(+
pi
4
) and Uˆy(−
pi
4
) are orthogonal to each other, which
enables Bob to read the keys precisely.
Our attacking scheme works as following:
(a1′) After step (a2) in the above protocol, Eve inter-
cepts all qubits from Alice and stores them. (We denote
these qubits as “set 1”). Meanwhile, sends her own qubits
with each of them being randomly in state |p〉, p is either
0 or 1. (We denote these qubits as “set 2”). Eve can
remember the state of each qubits sent from her.
(a2′) After step (a3), Eve intercepts all qubits from
Bob and stores them. Note that all these qubits are from
set 2 originally. Then, Eve sends set 1 to Alice.
(a3′) After step (a4), Eve intercepts all qubits from
Alice and measures each of them in ±pi
4
basis. Reading
the measurement outcome, Eve knows Alice’s choice of
pi
4
or −pi
4
, i.e., the bit values of each pulse from Alice,
k = 0, 1 for pi
4
or −pi
4
, respectively.
(a4′) According to the measurement result of each
qubits from Alice, Eve takes appropriate unitary rota-
tions to those qubits stored by her in step (a2′) and sends
them to Bob. Explicitly, to any qubit, if its original value
p = 0, Eve rotates the polarization by (−1)k pi
4
and sends
it to Bob; if p = 1, she first flips its polarization between
|0〉 and |1〉 and then rotates the polarization by (−1)k pi
4
and sends it to Bob. Bob will just implement step (a5)
and in such a way, Bob will have no error after the pro-
tocol.
Knowing that protocol 1 suffers from the above types
of impersonation attack [1], they have proposed protocol
2 and claimed that the modified protocol will be secure
under such attacks. We now show that Eve can access the
full information of the key from their modified protocol
by almost the same impersonation attack. Let us first
recall their modified protocol.
Protocol 2:
(b1) Alice sends two single-photon pulses of the polar-
ization angles θ1 and θ2 to Bob.
(b2) Bob rotates the polarization angles of the pulses
by φ + (−1)s pi
4
and φ + (−1)s⊕1 pi
4
,where the shuffling
parameter s ∈ {0, 1} is randonmly chosen by Bob and
⊕ denotes addition modulo 2. And then Bob sends the
pulses back to Alice.
(b3) Receiving the two pulses of their polarization an-
gles θ1+φ+(−1)
s pi
4
and θ2+φ+(−1)
s⊕1 pi
4
, Alice rotates
the polarization angles of the pulses by −θ1 + (−1)
k pi
4
and −θ2 + (−1)
k pi
4
respectively, where k ∈ {0, 1} is the
key value. She blocks one of the qubits and sends the
other to Bob. The paper [1] introduces the blocking fac-
tor b = 0, 1 to denote the case to let the first or the second
pulse go.
(b4) When the qubit travels to Bob, he rotates the
polarization angles of the pulses by −φ and measures
the polarization. He obtains the measurement outcome
lsk = s⊕ k ⊕ b as the prekey bit value.
(b5) Alice publicly announces her blocking factor b.
And depending on b and the shuffling parameter s, Bob
2can decode the original key bit by k = s⊕ b⊕ l.
Our attacking scheme is now the following:
(b1′) After step (b1), Eve intercepts and stores both
pulses from Alice. (We denote these pulses as “set E1”).
Eve also sends two pulses to Bob. These two pulses are
originally produced by Eve with random polarization an-
gles of θ1
′, θ2
′. Eve remembers the polarization angle of
each pulses.
(b2′) After step (b2) in protocol 2, Eve intercepts both
pulses from Bob, rotates each of them by angle−θ1
′
,−θ2
′
and stores them. (We denote these pulses as “set E2”).
Eve chooses her shuffling parameter s′ = 0 and ro-
tates the two pulses in set E1 by angle (−1)s
′ pi
4
and
(−1)s
′
⊕
1 pi
4
respectively. Eve sends the rotated pulses
in set E1 to Alice.
(b3′) After step (b3), Eve intercepts and measures the
pulse sent out by Alice in |0, pi
2
〉 basis. By reading mea-
surement outcome, she knows the value ls
′k = s′⊕k⊕b =
k ⊕ b since the value s′ is set by herself. (In our attack-
ing scheme, s′ = 0). Then she rotates the first pulse of
set E2 with the angle of (−1)k⊕b pi
4
, sends it to Bob and
discards the second pulse in set E2. (Remark: Although
Eve knows neither b nor k, she knows the value of k ⊕ b
and she can do the unitary rotation dependent on k⊕ b).
When Alice announces the value of b i.e., which pulse
she has blocked, Eve can get the value of k since she has
already known the value of k⊕ b and k = b⊕ (k⊕ b). On
the other hand, with the operation in step (b3′), Bob’s
result about k−value will be identical to Alice’s. Alice
and Bob can not discover the eavesdropping. When Bob
receives the pulse after step (b3′), he makes the measure-
ment like step (b5) and will get the value lsk = s⊕(k⊕b).
Although the b′ value chosen by Eve may be different
from the b value chosen by Alice, it does not cause any
channel noise since Eve’s actions in our attacking scheme
will not affect Bob’s measurement outcome for the value
l, which is l = s⊕ k ⊕ b.
Although it is known protocol 1 is probably insecure
under impersonation attack [1], it has been assumed that
protocol 2 is secure prior to our comment. We have for
the first time shown the Protocol is totally insecure un-
der our attack. Our eavesdropping method works even in
the case that Alice has a perfect single-photon source and
a transparent, noiseless channel. The protocols of blind
polarization bases are insecure in their present forms [1].
Moreover, in our present scheme, the quantum memories
which are not practical in nowadays technology are not
necessary, a long enough delay of the photon will be suffi-
cient. Therefore, our attacking scheme only need existing
technology.
[1] W-H.Kye et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005).
